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modern Europe. His rich analysis of the legal climate reflecting these prejudices is
likewise a nice addition to earlier work on the topic. Most importantly, his data on
the black population within France will provide the raw material for much work to
come — and there is still much that needs to be done. We need a richer, more
chronologically sensitive account of the relationship between slavery and race in
the seventeenth-century French Caribbean, where Boulle suggests many of
these attitudes first developed. We also need to understand where Amerindians
fit into this emerging racial ideology, work that is already underway by
Guillaume Aubert and by Boulle’s own student Masarah Van Eyck. None of
this, however, should detract from what Boulle has accomplished in this excellent
piece of scholarship. Students of slavery, the Atlantic world, French colonialism,
and early modern France will have to reckon with his findings for years to come.
Brett Rushforth
College of William and Mary Williamsburg, VA
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The “factory cripple,” the “fossey-jawed” matchmaker, the collier with “black
lung,” the mutilated miner, mill hand, or navvy, and the worker condemned to
a slow, painful death from an occupational disease were the familiar casualties
of industrializing Britain: the men, women, and children who frequent the
pages of nineteenth-century newspapers, parliamentary blue books, inspectors’
reports, short-time advocates’ polemics, and “condition of England” tracts. How
did they and their families cope? How did employers, coworkers, and the public
react? How were death and suffering in the workplace represented in printed
accounts? How did ideas about employer liability develop? Few labour historians
have systematically tackled such questions; Jamie Bronstein, in an important,
focused contribution to a developing field, deftly intertwines legal, social, and cul-
tural history in providing some persuasive answers.
She begins with the scale of the carnage. On the railways, to cite one example,
an undated report on the casualty rate over a six-year period for a single stretch of
track counted 32 deaths, 23 compound fractures, 74 simple fractures, 140 “severe”
cases of blast burns, bruising, cuts, and dislocations, and 400 “minor” instances of
lacerations, amputated fingers, and the like. Down the coal mines, to cite a second
example, 2,143 miners were killed between 1850 and 1852 — in explosions (from
flying debris and “choke damp”), roof falls, and shaft accidents, as well as from
other causes — and, during the century as a whole, nonfatal injuries outpaced
deaths by a factor of 100. In the textile mills, for a third example, in one six-
month period in 1849, factory inspectors in England and Scotland reported
2,021 accidents resulting in 22 deaths and 109 amputations; factory workers
were particularly susceptible to injury from unguarded machinery (spiked
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rollers, spinning shafts, moving belts, and flying shuttles) and occupational ill-
nesses (including respiratory diseases, varicose veins, deafness, and misshapen
knees). In the traditional trades beyond the railways, mines, and mills — construc-
tion, shipping, farming, brewing, and all those other jobs that employed the bulk
of the British workforce until the twentieth century — evidence for accidents and
illnesses is sparser and more anecdotal but suggests a similar harrowing pattern of
trauma and suffering.
What recourse did the maimed or the families of the bereaved have? Bronstein
walks us through the options, such as they were. Before the first introduction of an
employers’ liability law in 1880, a worker seeking compensation could sue an
employer in the civil courts. This was rather pointless (except maybe to shame
the employer and elicit community sympathy), since from the 1840s developing
common-law constructions made it (or confirmed that it was) almost impossible
for the worker to win. These amounted to the transparently pro-property
notion that the master could not be held accountable for workplace injuries —
even when machinery was unguarded and working conditions unsafe — since
the worker, as a free agent and in exchange for material gain, had implicitly
accepted the risks in taking on the job and had the notional recourse of
walking away from it if working conditions proved dangerous. Successive judges
also ruled that for an employer to be held responsible for medical expenses in
the event of one worker injuring another would constitute a miscarriage of
justice (the so-called “fellow-servant rule”) and that such employer liability
would also induce worker carelessness and negligence. In short, employers
blamed employees for workplace accidents, and the courts nearly always backed
them.
As the legal options were limited, what then for the families who had lost a
breadwinner or for incapacitated workers? One possibility was employer charity
(workplace paternalism coexisted quite comfortably with the failure to admit liab-
ility), but this was unsystematic and capricious. A second was succour from a com-
passionate public, notably in the form of national subscriptions in the wake of
well-publicized disasters — again, highly uneven in operation and enabling a
good deal of oft-resented social control by higher-class fund administrators.
Beyond these, very many relied on contributions to friendly societies, mutual
benefit organizations, sick clubs, or industrial insurance policies. The most unfor-
tunate, with limited or no access to the above, could struggle to continue working
at less demanding jobs, rely on the wages of wives and children, beg in the streets,
or fall back on the poor law and the workhouse.
Why did this pattern of non-liability, scattered charity, self-help, and minimal
state intervention change and the health-and-safety regime familiar to the twenti-
eth century begin to develop? Bronstein, in a fascinating chapter on the “cultural
meaning of accidents,” explains how the copious, melodramatic, and gory accounts
of workplace accidents elicited Christian sympathy or a sense of divine judgment
or of the inscrutability of Providence, but little notion of the need to crack down
on unsafe work practices or to provide adequate compensation for the wounded
or bereaved. Not only that: the idea of masculine independence and the male
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worker as a free agent militated strongly against effeminizing him by legislating
state protection. The developing discourse of legislative and judicial protection
for irrational, unfree agents — women and children in factories and (in the
American context and to a limited extent) slaves — only served to reinforce the
resistance to positive change for white males. These men, striving for political
equality and reluctant to undercut their case, also tended to cling to the myth
of free agency.
These powerful impediments were eroded only very gradually, as part of the
broader transition in thinking that moved away from a focus on moral failure
demanding individual solutions towards a diagnosis of intractable social problems
requiring government intervention. Bronstein charts the early attempts from the
1830s of utilitarians like Edwin Chadwick to bring in no-fault workers’ compen-
sation legislation; that of factory inspectors like Leonard Horner to recast male
mill workers as deserving of protection; and the important breakthrough of the
1850 Mines Inspection Act, a weak measure but significant in that it introduced
the notion of safety regulation and inspection into a male-dominated industry.
Only in the 1870s, however, in the wake of the 1867 Reform Act that gave some
working men the vote, were labour representatives in parliament with the
support of the newly formed Trades Union Congress able to put the issue of
no-fault compensation squarely on the parliamentary agenda. The final
outcome, the Employers’ Liability Act of 1880, was a temporary, compromise
measure, pushed through by Gladstone’s government in the face of much parlia-
mentary opposition and employer hostility.
Bronstein is a surefooted guide through all of this. Her detailed contrasts with
the somewhat different and delayed pattern of response in America provide very
useful clarity and perspective; it is a pity she has failed to do the same for conti-
nental Europe, especially as she makes repeated comparative reference to (but
gives no information about) the no-fault models of compensation to be found
there at an earlier date. The securing of a more predictable workers’ compen-
sation scheme was undeniably a good thing, but Bronstein’s final thoughts, on
the downside to such progress, are underdeveloped and rather enigmatic, and
some lengthier reflections on post-1880 developments in Britain and elsewhere
would have been revealing. Yet, caveats aside, this is a well-researched, perceptive,
fluent, and valuable contribution to the literature.
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As the importance of the Athabasca oil sands grows steadily in contemporary
economic and political spheres, a growing number of focused, academic studies
have emerged that examine this important resource. Developing Alberta’s Oil
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